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ABSTRACT 
Major events potentially affect all types of essential services in both government 
and private sectors. These are services that residents expect to be delivered, required by 
other services to function, and are critical to the life safety of residents. If those services 
collapse, there will be a grave threat to life and limb. Failure to properly ensure 
continuity of essential governmental and private services in the wake of a natural disaster 
or terrorist attack could result in societal chaos. 
A community expects the response and outcome of any event to be the same, 
failing to realize the interdependencies required for continuation of necessary services. 
Planning in isolation only protects single aspects. Contributing factors to interdependency 
effects are stove-pipe planning and ineffective information sharing. A stove-pipe or 
vertical sector-based system creates an environment of isolation within a community 
rather than a cohesive interacting system.  
With the increasing potential for a major event to occur, government, private 
business and the general public have not identified and shared their expectations of 
essential services as the precursor to an effective continuity program. Public – private 
collaboration allows the expectations to be discussed and addressed as a community 
rather than an independent discipline issue. 
As public and private expectations are identified, two relevant issues are required 
to address the capabilities required to deliver the essential services. They are horizontal 
planning and resilience. Regional or local governmental structures provide the platform 
for horizontal planning and cooperation for emergency preparedness that is essential to 
civil protection. A community based system is the mechanism for improving coordination 
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We cannot prepare against every kind of misfortune that might befall us.1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Major events potentially affect all types of essential services in both government 
and private sectors. These are services that residents expect to be delivered are required 
by other services to function, and are critical to the life safety of residents. If these 
services collapse, the result would be a grave threat to life and limb. Failure to properly 
ensure the continuity of essential governmental and private sector services in the wake of 
a natural disaster or terrorist attack could result in societal chaos.  
During the response and recovery periods of a crisis, the public relies on the 
government to provide essential services. Federal, state and local governments maintain 
plans, identifying the roles and responsibilities of those disciplines and agencies that 
provide those services. However, these plans often do not address the private sector roles 
and responsibilities that address the majority of the critical infrastructure in the nation. 
As demonstrated in the past two years, the lack of any continuity of essential 
services forms the Achilles Heel of emergency response and recovery.  In the immediate 
and long-term aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, and ice and snow storms 
in the Midwest, the inability to maintain or quickly recover essential services has cost 
lives, ruined economic enterprise, and altered the social and cultural foundations of 
communities across the nation.   In particular, “the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s (FEMA) response to Hurricane Katrina gave convincing evidence that our 
systems have not met desired community standards.”2 The inability to provide evacuation 
transportation and subsequently adequate food and shelter to those stranded residents, led 
                                                 
1 Fred C. Ikle,” An Argument for Homeland Defense,” The Washington Quarterly 21 no. 2 (1998), 8-
10.  Retrieved July 24, 2007, from Research Library database (Document ID: 32444068).  
2  Mark Alavosius, Ph.D., “Behavior Analysis and Domestic Preparedness,” The Current Repertoire, 
(Spring 2006): 3.  
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to chaos and loss of life. People around the world viewed the anguish and death, as 
trapped people waited days for government assistance.   
Millions of people were left without power on August 14, 2003, when the largest 
blackout in the history of North America occurred.3 The blackout affected several major 
metropolitan areas — including Detroit, Cleveland, Columbus, New York, Toronto, and 
Ottawa. The Michigan Public Service Commission Report on the August 14 Blackout 
report stated that “during and following the power outage a number of issues arose that 
required response. These issues clearly demonstrated the critical interdependencies that 
exist to support our citizens and businesses”.4   
A contributing factor to interdependency effects is the federal-oriented stove-pipe 
planning and information sharing approach.  The continued sector-based system creates 
an environment of isolation within a community, rather than a cohesive interacting 
system. The stove-pipe approach is solidly entrenched down to the local level and fails to 
allow a cohesive interacting system that would lead to the further development of 
community continuity planning. The nation’s defensive systems were categorized as 
“stovepipes” by the 9/11 Commission, noting that synthesis and analysis of data streams 
within agencies were absent, and patterns that revealed crises were either unseen or not 
recognized for their significance.5  
Men build too many walls and not enough bridges. 
       — Sir Issac Newton 
With the potential for a major event to occur increasing, government, private 
business and the general public have not identified and shared their expectations of 
essential services as the precursor to an effective continuity program. For some, the 
implementation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) planning 
guidance or identification of essential services within an Emergency Operations Plan 
                                                 
3 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report of the August 14th Blackout in the 
United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, (April 2004): 1. 
4 Michigan Public Safety Commission. Report on August 14th Blackout.  (November 2003): 70.     
5 Alavosius, “Behavior Analysis and Domestic Preparedness,” 3. 
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would seem sufficient. The effect of the long-term failures — at every level of 
government — to plan and prepare adequately to provide basic essential services for a 
major hurricane in the Gulf was evident in the inadequate preparations before Katrina’s 
landfall and then again in the initial response to the storm.6  
FEMA continuity planning focuses on the essential services that local and state 
government would need to provide, and fails to address those essential services provided 
by the private sector necessary to maintain the government-provided services.  Little 
guidance is available to state and local governments regarding mobilization of private 
sector resources.7 FEMA and other agencies have not undertaken a planning process that 
takes into account the expectations of residents, with respect to public and private 
essential services during an emergency. 
Key services are owned by the private sector and are often utilized by numerous 
communities and even states. In communities located along international borders, other 
services are provided from outside the borders of the United States — often funneled 
through various ports. With vulnerable infrastructure, high risk, and just-in-time delivery 
considerations, the urgent need to ensure the continuity of essential services rises to a top 
homeland security priority. It is important that government, business and our residents 
identify essential services within their community, both those passing through their 
communities in support of other areas of the nation and those staying within their 
jurisdictions.   
As required by law, all jurisdictions with a recognized emergency management 
program must maintain emergency operation plans for the perceived threats to their 
community. The plans operate on a number of assumptions pertaining to the specific 
community; they have not significantly been altered since 9/11, as indicated by the 
current FEMA, State and Local Guide 101, Guide for All Hazard Emergency Operations 
                                                 
6 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation  Still Unprepared: Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs (GPO – Washington, DC: May 2006): 8.     
7 Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina and the Role for Standards and Conformity Assessment 
Programs (New York:  ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel, March 2007): 10. 
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Planning dated September 1996.8  No standardized continuity planning requirements are 
mandated at the state or local levels in the United States. 
The community expects the response and outcome of any event to be the same. 
What fails to be realized is that services depend on one another for continuation.  
Planning in isolation only protects single aspects. During Hurricane Katrina, emergency 
operations plans could not be implemented as flooding disrupted communications, 
transportation, feeding, and sheltering, among other things.9  The disruption of these 
services directly affected the responders’ ability to effectively provide for the life safety 
of the community.10 Calls for assistance went unanswered, creating confusion, which 
then fueled public chaos.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The assumption of this thesis research is that local emergency operations plans 
address the four elements of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response 
and recovery, as it applies to the requirements of the specific community. Although 
mutual aid, along with state and federal assistance, are in place, a major event will isolate 
a community without additional resources for an extended period of time. Therefore, 
communities must maximize local resources though planning and resilience efforts for 
self-sustainment. 
Based on the local government’s mandate to provide for the life safety of their 
residents, this thesis research will seek to: 
 
1. Determine the essential services that the public expects during a large-
scale event and also whether the expectations are being addressed in 
public and private continuity planning. 
                                                 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, State and Local Guide 101; Guide for All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Planning, (Washington, D.C.: September 1996). 




2. Identify the necessary information and actions required to close the gaps 
in public–private expectations and delivery of essential services.   
 
Overall, the primary question this thesis considers: Is the current continuity guidance for 
governments adequate to achieve community continuity of essential services based on the 
true public and private expectations?    
C. METHODOLOGY 
A close review of the existing continuity planning process at various levels of 
government and the private sector will occur to identify the existing continuity planning.  
Furthermore, a survey will be conducted to establish the level of confidence and the 
expectations of essential services of residents within a community. These identifiable 
factors will be used as part of the analysis and recommendations for more effective 
community continuity planning approaches. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will strengthen the existing continuity planning guidance for local 
communities. The proposed strategies presented in this thesis will provide a mechanism 
to create a common continuity plan between the public and private partners for use by 
local governments. The existing literature focuses on public and private as two separate 
entities. This thesis is intended to initiate critical thinking necessary for continuity 
planning to be a collaborative partnership between the public and private sectors. 
Chapter II examines the literature on existing governmental guidance, case 
studies, and congressional reports, along with the private sector efforts. 
Chapter III examines citizen’s expectations of essential services in a major event. 
This chapter contains the results of the St. Clair County survey. 
Chapter IV presents the ability of government to meet those expectations.  
Chapter V identifies other challenges in meeting expectations. 
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Chapter VI addresses how the identified gaps could be narrowed through several 
recommendations.  
Chapter VII concludes with some future thoughts. 
This thesis may provide governmental and private-sector leaders a compelling 
argument to implement horizontal planning that addresses community expectations based 
on risk and capabilities. It will further identify the need for proactive preparedness efforts 
to overcome the lack of capabilities required to meet community expectations. This 
collaboration and planning effort will assist in developing trust and ownership within the 
community.  




















A. EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS 
Among the limited types of literature available at the governmental level, there 
are few documents available in the context of continuity of governmental operations 
plans.  There are governmental documents that address the need for continuity planning 
but do not require the implementation of it. Presidential Decision Directive 67 (PDD 
67)11 was issued October 21, 1998, and required federal agencies to develop planning 
that would ensure the delivery of essential services. The Federal Preparedness Circular 
65, (PDD-67)12 established responsibility for Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning 
within the federal government as the primary responsibility of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Overall, FEMA was responsible for establishing common 
standards that could be utilized in the development of COOP plans.  The emphasis for 
planning was on federal governmental agencies rather than state and local governments 
and the private sector. 
The FEMA document, State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Planning, presents the preparedness, response, and short-term 
recovery planning elements that warrant inclusion in state and local Emergency 
Operations Plans (EOP).13  The limited focus of continuity in the guide is centered on the 
continuation of government decision making.  Historically, preparedness has been 
conceived as incident-centric and response-oriented, rather than proactively 
implementing lessons-learned strategies prior to the occurrence of the next incident. 
 
                                                 
11 Presidential Decision Directive 67 (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1998). 
12 Federal Executive Branch Continuity Of Operations (COOP)  Federal Preparedness Circular 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, July 1999). 
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, State and Local Guide 101, Guide for All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Planning, i. 
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Since the events of September 11, 2001, the government has developed the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security.14 This includes the development of numerous 
publications such as the National Response Plan.15 The National Response Plan is built 
on the premise that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level 
possible.16  
The NRP further defines such a major incident as “Any natural or manmade 
incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 
damage, or disruption, severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, 
economy, national moral, and/or government functions.”17 A major event could result in 
sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds 
resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private sector authorities in the 
impacted areas; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency 
services to an extent that national security could be threatened.18 
Knowing the residents expectations of both public and private essential services, 
provides a baseline for understanding the sharing of responsibilities during an emergency.  
Without this, the public expectation of government is to provide all the necessary 
essential services to maintain life safety.  
B. CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS 
In a 2006 statement before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security on 
Appropriations, Under Secretary for Preparedness George W. Foresman discussed the 
importance of the nation’s preparedness. Referencing state and local coordination for 
preparedness, he stated, “key to this effort is the understanding that national preparedness 
actions must complement and not conflict with state and local activities, and these actions 
                                                 
14 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
GPO, July 2002). 
15 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004). 
16 Ibid., 15. 
17 Ibid., 63.  
18 Department of Homeland Security, Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, Version 
4.0 (GPO Washington, DC: May 22, 2006): 22. 
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require sustained commitment among Congress, federal agencies, local and state 
governments, the private sector, and the American people.”19 
In testimony before the United States Senate Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee, Arnold Howitt, Ph.D., and Herman Leonard, Ph.D., of Harvard 
University sent a clear message that Hurricane Katrina was “failures of systems and of 
failures to construct systems in advance that would have permitted and helped to produce 
better performances and outcomes.”20  Even with existing planning guidance, contention 
is that government has known for years that there were systems of preparation and 
response that would not address continuity of operations in a major event.  
In a November 8, 2004, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 
provided the background and issues of the Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the 
Executive Branch. Information reported by the General Accountability Office (GAO), 
found during an audit of several federal agency COOP plans, elements defined by Federal 
Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC-65) were lacking.  Moreover, GAO found FEMA:  
1) did not provide specific criteria through FPC-65 for identifying essential 
functions, or to address interdependencies between agencies;  
2) did not review the essential functions identified in its assessments of COOP 
planning, or follow up with agencies to determine whether they addressed previously 
identified weaknesses;  
3) did not conduct tests or exercises that could confirm that the identified essential 
functions were correct.21   
Based on the facts, the responsible federal agency failed to provide the necessary 
oversight; other federal agencies are likely to continue planning on ill defined 
                                                 
19 Statement of George W. Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness to the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations, (Washington, DC: September 7, 2006).  
20 Testimony of Herman B. Leonard and Arnold M. Howitt to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, “Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Responding to Katrina-Class 
Disturbances in the United States,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 2, 
Article 5, 2006.  
21 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the 
Executive Branch: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2004): 13. 
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assumptions.22  In response to the November 8, 2004, CRS Report for Congress, the 
president identified effective planning as a national security priority and directed the 
Department of Homeland Security to conduct a nationwide plan review. One of the four 
core questions addressed the consistency with the existing FEMA planning guidance and 
voluntary standards such as National Fire Protection Association 1600.23  The majority of 
the current emergency operations plans and planning processes cannot be characterized 
as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage major events as defined in the 
National Response Plan. 24 Furthermore, basic plans do not adequately address continuity 
of government.  
C. ACADEMIC STUDIES 
Although Department of Homeland Security officials stresses the importance of 
private-public partnerships, the primary conclusion of the Council on Foreign Relations 
working group is that this is not being accomplished. The report, CSR No. 13, “Neglected 
Defense,” recommends stronger leadership and working relationships with the private 
sector as a means to make the U.S. more secure.25 Stephen Flynn, a Senior Fellow for 
National Security Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations and author of America the 
Vulnerable has indicated that the government is still unprepared.  In the report of an 
Independent Task Force, the burden of preparing and responding to major terrorist 
attacks lies primarily outside the federal government at the local and state levels, and 
with the private-sector companies that own and operate much of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.26  
                                                 
22 Congressional Research Service, 12. 
23 National Fire Protection Association, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity 2004. 
24 Department of Homeland Security, The National Plan Review, Phase 2 (Washington, DC: DHS, 
2006): ix. 
25 Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No. 13 “Neglected Defense” (Washington, DC: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2006): 12.   
26 Council of Foreign Relations, America-Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2002): 38. 
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Another important part of literature review involves case studies.  Recent major 
events such as September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina provide a significant amount 
of review.  The Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at John F. Kennedy School 
of Government has indicated that as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, 
domestic preparedness relies on cross-jurisdictional and cross-professional cooperation 
and coordination between agencies, non-governmental private and not-for-profit 
organizations, and levels of government that are not accustomed to working together.27 
The report recommends government develop these important partnerships. Until this 
culture of public–private partnership for preparedness is further developed, government 
and business will continue to plan in separate but parallel paths. To many, preparedness 
is simply a name on an organizational chart or a step in the cycle of emergency 
management.28    
Another leading authority is George Mason University, publisher of numerous 
studies regarding resiliency and collaboration in the public–private sectors. Paula 
Scalingi, among other Subject Matter experts, has contributed to these studies, in addition 
to her own publications. 
D. CASE STUDIES 
As there have been limited major events occurring in the United States, it is 
important to maximize lessons learned from these events.  Although most communities 
will never face a major event, one cannot predict when or where the next one will occur. 
To demonstrate the need for an effective continuity plan, the lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina indicate the lack of preparedness at all levels of government for major 
events.  “They reflect the lack of a shared vision on how prepared everyone needs to be 
— individually and collectively — and a shared system for a comprehensive national 
approach to preparedness to focus our efforts and to provide the standard tools and 
                                                 
27 Memorandum to Secretary Ridge, Intergovernmental Dimensions on Domestic Preparedness, 
Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2001): 27. 
28 Foresman statement. 
 12
processes we need to get us there.”29 Katrina was not isolated to one town or city, or even 
one state. Individual local and state plans, as well as relatively new plans created by the 
federal government since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, failed to adequately 
account for widespread or simultaneous catastrophes.30  After Action reports indicated 
problems with the quality of planning at various levels of government.  
The private sector has been involved with business continuity planning for many 
years. The Disaster Recovery Journal has been in place for nearly twenty years to 
support business continuity planning.  In view of the Journal’s numerous lessons learned 
from various disasters, it is clear that the private sector has made significant progress in 
continuity planning, including secondary relocation centers for operations.  Business 
Recovery Centers in the 1992 Chicago flooding were immediately in use as emergency 
centers for key operations.31 Examining the prepared businesses after the sheer 
magnitude of Hurricane Andrew, the recovery lessons learned did not reveal any 
surprises. Those that were unprepared experienced lengthier and more complex recovery 
issues. 
The 2003 Blackout in the Northeast provided numerous public and private after 
action reports that identified the disciplines that were directly affected and then by the 
failure of interdependencies at all levels. Most individual plans were ineffective due to 
the failure to address the continuity of those interdependencies which often were private-
sector oriented. 
The 9/11 Commission realized the importance of public–private sector 
partnerships and asked the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to develop a 
National Standard for Preparedness that could be utilized by the private sector. One of the 
primary ANSI recommendation was “entities in both the public and private sectors would 
be well served in their implementation of post-Hurricane Katrina recommendations by 
complying with NFPA 1600 and using it as a guideline for their disaster/emergency 
                                                 
29 Foresman statement. 
30 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned, 1. 
31  Richard l. Arnold, “Special Report, Underground Flood Hits Chicago’s Loop, Shutting down 
Businesses for Weeks,” Disaster Recovery Journal (1992): 1-4. 
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management and business continuity planning.”32 One recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission report was the endorsement of this standard for private preparedness.33 
After the 9/11 Report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was 
signed into law on December 18, 2004.34  In Sec. 7305, “Private Sector Preparedness,” 
the Act recognized NFPA 1600 as the standard the private sector should follow, although 
it did not mandate it as a National Standard.35 
Although the Executive Branch has established continuity planning at the federal 
level, it has done little toward the adoption at the state and local levels. The continuity 
that is in place is focused mainly on the governmental operations and little on the private 
sector. Planning in place does not address the interdependencies of a community, let 
alone the identification of citizen’s expectations of essential services. 
As a result of backlash from recent events, lessons learned and congressional 
reports are identifying the need for continuity of essential services in the planning 
process. Without movement from the Department of Homeland Security to change the 
planning process, the continuity issues are not at the forefront. This is occurring despite 
the mounting evidence of the citizen’s expectations from government. 
Non-government studies, along with change in the private sector, now realize the 
complexity of interdependencies and delivery of essential services. The private sector 
understands the expectations of their customers and is implementing the necessary 
change to deliver that service. Profit is the motivating factor for this. 
                                                 
32 ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel, Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina and the Role 
for Standards and Conformity Assessment Programs. 12.  
33 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton 
& Co, 2004): 398.  
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III. EXPECTATIONS OF CITIZENS FOR ESSENTIAL SERVICES 
As we will never be able to protect everything, everywhere, all the time, 
from every adversary and every modality of attack, now is clearly the time 
for clearheaded prioritization of policies and resources. Unless we 
examine this issue in its totality, we may simply be displacing risk from 
one infrastructure to another.36 
 
A. WHAT IS MEANT BY EXPECTATIONS? 
Understanding what expectations the public has of essential service prior to an 
event is required to evaluate existing capabilities of meeting those expectations. This 
chapter will identify what expectations are and how they affect the public. Although 
expectations may appear clear, the complexity of interdependencies and the current 
planning mind-set affects those expectations in a large-scale event. Utilizing a public 
confidence and expectations survey, analysis of the results will address the public’s 
perception of expectations and provide a level for the government to compare the existing 
capabilities. 
The United States has long operated on the general premise that governments 
exist to do those things that individuals alone or in free and voluntary association (e.g., 
families and charities), are not best positioned to do for themselves, such as ensuring 
protected communities through public safety and law enforcement.37 This has resulted in 
citizens having numerous expectations of government. An expectation can be defined as 
“the act or state of looking forward or anticipating.”38 In today’s society, many people 
live for today and do not focus on future events that may or may not occur.  
                                                 
36 Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo1, Co-Chairman, Cyber Threats Task Force, Homeland Defense 
Project, Center for  Strategic and International Studies. Before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. 
Congress, June 12, 2001.http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/congress/june21_01.html (accessed February 11, 
2007).  
37 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned, 11. 
38 Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/expectation (accessed: July 12, 2007).  
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Although there are expectations, it is important to measure the confidence of 
those expectations being delivered. Failure or anticipated failure creates confidence 
issues that may create a need for alternate planning. These are issues that confront the 
public in both emergency and non-emergency times.  
B.  DAILY EXPECTATIONS 
Everyone is constantly, directly or indirectly, affected by expectations, whether 
their own or from someone else. Advertisements are created in expectation that the 
viewer will react in a certain way. Employers, school systems, healthcare workers, for 
example, all have expectations of their customers, and, as a customer, there must be an 
expectation that leads to utilization of the services. Expectations are so frequent and 
common that few people give thought to them until a critical issue arises.  
On a daily basis, communities provide essential services that are accepted and 
expected by the residents of the community. Emergency response can be measured by the 
minutes required to arrive at a single event such as a house fire, traffic accident or 
medical emergency. Road maintenance occurs regularly, allowing residents to work, shop 
and enjoy recreation.  
Critical infrastructures provide for a quality life and an expected way of life. 
Every day, without a second thought, our citizens flip a switch that provides light in their 
homes, feel the warmth of heat provided by gas and oil, eat food, and enjoy water 
provided to the residence or business. These services are provided by the private and 
public sectors with very little delay or interruption — until a major event disrupts these 
services and our expected way of life. 
C. CONCEPT OF PROTECTION 
September 11, 2001, was a wakeup call for a very complacent society.  For 
decades, the United States believed that the borders were protected and defended by a 
world class military. This allowed for the public expectation of a nation secure from acts 
of terror. 
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The 9/11 Commission Report provides significant insight and recommendations 
to secure our homeland. A strategic insight was clearly the philosophy that protection was 
no longer the basis for the security of our homeland.  It was essential that the country 
change policy to move beyond protection-based planning that had been in place for 
decades 
This policy of protection met the expectations of citizens and was acceptable 
when the adversary and their method of attack were known. The experience of successful 
means of unconventional attacks by unconventional sources has clearly demonstrated that 
protection is not enough.  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated to 
the United States a reality that will confront our nation and those of the world for years to 
come. It has been said that the most fatal illusion is the settled point of view.39 The 
United States can no longer rely on the protections of time and distance. Instead, non-
conventional attacks will come with little or no notice by adversaries from within as well 
as outside the nation. These non-conventional attacks will challenge our current planning 
and delivery of essential services in our communities.   
D. DEPENDENCIES 
It is essential that local government understand the expectations of services that 
are provided to the public prior to a major event and the services they can adequately 
provide. These include public and private services that may not be operated or provided 
from within the community itself. This creates dependencies that cross many 
communities in which the service cannot be controlled or ensured locally, yet are often 
taken for granted by the public.  
In describing the book, The Edge of Disaster, Anne-Marie Slaughter states that 
“our growing exposure to manmade and natural perils is largely rooted in our own 
                                                 
39 Remarks by Secretary Ridge to the Commonwealth Club of California, (Washington, DC: Release 
Date: July 23, 2003):1.   
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negligence as we take for granted the infrastructure handed down to us by earlier 
generations. Once the envy of the world, this infrastructure is now crumbling.”40   
The blackout of 2003 is a primary example of infrastructure failure. Large 
portions of the Midwest and Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, experienced 
an electric power outage affected an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 
megawatts (MW) of electric load.41 Electrical demand is outpacing our ability to produce 
the power. Peak electrical demand is expected to rise by 19 percent by 2016, but new 
transmission capacity is expected to increase by less than 7 percent.42  The necessity of 
electricity to deliver essential services must be understood and a priority in the planning 
process. 
During this blackout, Detroit Michigan had only one gasoline distribution 
terminal with a backup power supply operating.43 The terminal would not send its own 
tanker trucks out, however, because of unsafe road conditions due to the lack of operating 
traffic signals.44  Some gas stations with available gasoline were forced to shut down 
because they were unable to handle consumer behavior and had concerns for employee 
safety when others ran out of gasoline.  The lack of gasoline within numerous 
communities forced essential facilities with generators to cease operations. Essential 
services affected by the gasoline shortage included feeding, transportation, water, and 
communications, among numerous other disciplines, causing significant disruption of the 
normal lifestyle that people expect.  
During hurricane Katrina, the breakdown of essential services left people stranded 
without assistance and a government that also lacked the necessary essential resources.45 
                                                 
40 Anne Marie Slaughter, dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University, Edge of Disaster, New York, 2007. (jacket cover)..  
41 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report of the August 14th Blackout in the 
United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, 1. 
42 Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation. New York, NY: Random 
Books, 2007, 171. 
43 Michigan Public Safety Commission. Report on August 14th Blackout, 82.   
44 Ibid. 
45 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned, 11. 
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The failure of a levee that was a protected critical infrastructure caused further 
devastation and escalated the failure of essential services from all levels of government. 
Although the hurricane contributed to the amount of water that caused the failure, studies 
conducted prior to the event indicated a high possibility of failure in that situation. 
Hurricane Katrina was not isolated to one town, city, or even one state. Individual 
local and state plans, as well as relatively new plans created by the federal government 
since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, failed to adequately account for 
widespread or simultaneous catastrophes.46  There will be those who say that they have 
emergency operations plans in place to provide essential services to the community. 
Businesses may claim they have continuity plans in place for their facilities. However, 
the literature review found that these plans are specific to individual sectors and contain 
numerous assumptions regarding expected services. Not addressed are the assumptions 
that services will be available, without research into the planning process within those 
disciplines as to how those services will be provided. The reliance of essential services on 
our infrastructure is critical.  
The Council for Excellence in Government conducted a survey that showed great 
concern from the public and first responders about terrorist attacks on critical 
infrastructure. Breaking critical infrastructure down into its parts, 73 percent of first 
responders and 49 percent of the public worry over an attack on power plants, and 66 
percent of first responders and 44 percent of the public express the same degree of 
concern about water facilities.47  Do these statistics justify focusing strictly on protecting 
these facilities?  Government has recognized that critical infrastructure security planning 
and protection must be a public-private partnership but have not found a method of 
implementation. The National Strategy for Homeland Security established broad 
principles that should guide the allocation of funding and who should bear the financial 
burden for homeland security.48 In creating that division of labor, the strategy concludes 
                                                 
46 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 11. 
47 The Center for Excellence in Government, From the Home Front to the Front Lines: America 
Speaks Out About Homeland Security, A study by the Council for Excellence in Government Prepared by 
Hart-Teeter, March 2004, 43.  
48 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, 138. 
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that the government should only address those activities that the market does not 
adequately provide, such as border security and national defense.49 For other elements of 
homeland security, such as safeguarding critical infrastructure, the strategy declares that 
sufficient incentives exist in the private market to supply protection, and the private 
sector should be relied upon for that.50  
The recent natural disasters have clearly demonstrated that events of magnitude 
are not isolated to the geographic boundaries of a political jurisdiction or the inclusive 
business content of one of the seventeen existing specific critical infrastructure planning 
sectors. Blind to jurisdictional barriers, the public will continue to demand more public 
safety services at a higher quality and lower overall cost.51 
Understanding that if protection of these key critical infrastructures fails, the 
services provided will not be available, which will create a cascading effect of 
interdependencies in other sectors.  This failure then limits the capabilities to deliver the 
essential services that the public expects, causing loss of confidence in government. 
E.  PUBLIC CONFIDENCE/EXPECTATIONS SURVEY DESIGN AND 
TESTING 
Local communities must understand what their residents deem as essential 
services and not focus solely on those provided by their sector or discipline.  To better 
understand this, a public confidence survey was conducted within St. Clair County, 
Michigan; it included questions regarding expectations of essential services. Survey 
respondents were randomly selected from the county jury pool. A target sample of six 
hundred residents, representing the population of one hundred and thirty-five thousand 
residing in the emergency management program area, was taken. The percent of county 
population was identified for each community and utilized to ensure an equal sampling 
per jurisdiction. 
                                                 
49 Flynn, Edge of Disaster, 138. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The Council of State Governments, Regional Solutions for Enhanced Public Safety, Public Safety 
Brief, December 2005, 6.  
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St. Clair County, Michigan, is unique for its combination of high concentration of 
critical infrastructure, relatively low tax base, and population.  Sitting adjacent Ontario, 
Canada’s Chemical Valley, St. Clair County is the nation’s primary entry point for 
carriers of hazardous, radioactive, and flammable materials between the United States 
and Canada.  The county is the second-ranked entry point in the United States for 
hazardous materials imports, the second busiest northern border crossing in America and 
third-ranked commercial point of entry for the North American Continent crossing for 
forty-eight hundred commercial trucks and twelve thousand passenger vehicles daily, and 
5.8 million commercial and passenger vehicles annually.  Thus, St. Clair County is the 
nation’s principal gateway for international trade with Canada, with 27 percent of total 
North American land-based international trade.  Waterway traffic on the St. Clair River is 
7,432 vessels carrying over 86 million tons of product annually.  Under the St. Clair 
River, on which those freighters pass, approximately thirty pipelines connect the U.S. and 
Canada.  They carry a product value of greater than $2.1 billion (2004) and range in 
diameter from six to forty-eight inches.    
America’s and Canada’s economic and national security, and the welfare, 
opportunities and freedoms afforded its citizens, are all dependent upon a vast network of 
highly complex, automated, largely privately owned and operated and inextricably 
interdependent national and global critical infrastructure systems and services.  These 
critical cyber and physical infrastructures produce and distribute energy, enable 
communications, control transportation, ensure the availability of food, water, and 
emergency care, and moreover, provide every service and support activity that defines 
and empowers both countries.   
With a considerable amount of this critical infrastructure located within or passing 
through the St. Clair County area, there were concerns about higher risk and the 
consequences to both countries if an incident occurred. Delivery of essential services is 
two-fold. One is the sustainment and preservation of the lives of the one hundred seventy 
thousand residents, and the other is to ensure continued flow of commerce that supports 
millions of people.    
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The survey results provide an understanding of current public confidence and 
expectations of the government to provide essential services in a large-scale event. 
Essential services are provided by government at different levels, in addition to the 
private sector. The St. Clair County survey utilized three questions in an attempt to 
identify and separate the essential services of county government, local government and 
the private business sector. Full survey results can be found in Appendix 1.    
The questions were presented in an open fashion that did not attempt to direct a 
specific response. This form of questioning led to various levels of interpretation. One of 
the questions asked, “Does the public expect government to physically provide the 
essential service or ensure that the planning process includes the delivery of it?” It is an 
assumption for the expectation of medical services as it applies to pre-hospital care to 
include Emergency Medical Transport and Hospital Emergency Room Care. Some of 
these services are provided by government and some by the private sector 
The following chart provides the order of expectations for the delivery of county, 
local and private sector essential services in a major event. The questions were presented 
requiring the respondent to list five most essential services expected and who they 
expected it to be provided by.  
Table 1.   Public expectations of essential services.  
County Local Private 
1. Medical 17.2 % 1. Medical 16.7 % 1. Food 12.0 % 
2. Shelter 14.1 % 2. Shelter 12.3 % 2. Shelter 10.1 % 
3. Food 8.4 % 3. Communication 10.5 % 3. Water 8.3 % 
4. Water 8.2 % 4. Food 8.6 % 4. Medical 8.1 % 
5. Communication 9.1 % 5. Water 8.3 % 5. None 6.2 % 
 
The results for government contained the same five expectations in different 
rankings.  There were 122 participants that listed medical as their number one expectation 
for county government and 99 for local government even though the majority of services 
are provided by the private sector.  The results may demonstrate that the public does not 
understand which agency or business provides the different types of essential services.  
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The results do possibly indicate the public expects these five essential services delivered 
— and they do not care who provides them. The services required to ensure operations 
are a collaborative effort between the private and public partners, which relies on a strong 
network of interdependencies.  
The first expectation was that of medical services. If citizens expect the medical 
system to be operational in a large-scale event, not only to provide treatment in life-
threatening situations, but to continue addressing the everyday health needs, serious 
problems arise. Appointments scheduled weeks in advance and the inability to deliver 
service is a significant disruption of everyday life.  This disruption can create higher 
demand on emergency medical services which may overwhelm existing physical and 
human resources. Additional consideration must be given to external resources required, 
such as medicine, supplies and staffing. These interdependencies create a very complex 
system that challenges the basic expectations. 
The second expectation was shelter. Shelter is one of the basic expectations in life 
and a majority of residents own or rent a home that contains the comforts they have 
worked to provide for themselves. Homes are where many of our required essentials 
come together to provide our quality of life. Do we assume that shelter is considered to 
be a citizen’s home containing the basic essentials such as food and water or government-
provided locations to house displaced residents? 
When major events occur, residents often rely on friends and family to provide 
the necessary shelter until they can safely return to their homes. Sometimes it is 
necessary to turn to emergency shelters opened by the government. With the survey 
identifying food and water as being the next two public expectations, the sheltering 
expectation of the public could be for government to provide food and water as part of 
the sheltering process whether at a government shelter or private residences.   
The third expectation was food. Food is an essential part of life and is contained 
within our homes for daily use.  Food types include those that require cooking and others 
that require little preparation or are precooked with delivery in a matter of minutes.  
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Communities contain grocery stores and restaurants where food is plentiful and available 
for purchase daily. Many families stock their homes with food in conjunction with 
paydays creating various levels of inventory.  
In many cases, shelters are not equipped with food on a daily basis. Citizens and 
government agencies utilize and expect food to be available from these commercial 
establishments on immediate notice. With both government and the public expecting food 
immediately, the interdependencies of numerous public and private support agencies 
come into play. A failure or disruption in the supply chain creates the potential for the 
unmet expectation of food.   
The fourth expectation was water. Water being a life-essential element can be 
assumed as the reason for being listed.  “Human life, as with all animal and plant life on 
the planet, is dependent upon water. Not only do we need water to grow our food, 
generate our power and run our industries, but we need it as a basic part of our daily lives 
— our bodies need to ingest water every day to continue functioning.”52 People expect 
safe water, whether provided by a municipal water system or a private well.    
Did the public expectation focus on water only as the essential need for the human 
body? If the participants understood the importance of water in the interdependencies 
required to deliver essential services, a higher placement might be in order. One can live 
on water alone for a period of time; however, the other identified expectations require the 
use of water in some form for providing other essential services as well. 
Beyond water as an essential health item, there is also health issues associated 
with wastewater treatment in communities. In the blackout of 2003, some wastewater 
systems had emergency backup electrical generators; some wastewater systems without 
backup power were able to store sanitary sewage in the gravity collection system.53 
However, after filling the space in the limited storage of the sanitary sewer, personnel 
were faced with options of either allowing raw sewage to back up into residential 
                                                 
52  Len Abrams, “Water for Basic Needs,” A 1st World Water Development Report (n.p.: World Health 
Organization, 2001), available at  http://www.africanwater.org/basic_needs (accessed September 9, 2007). 
53Michigan Public Safety Commission. Report on August 14th Blackout, 80.  
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basements, with significant public health issues, or overflowing at some point in the 
system to the receiving waters — a lake or a river.54  These are interdependency issues 
that must be addressed when considering expectations and the realization that “water” is 
not just for drinking and cooking. 
The next essential service identified was communications. Citizens receive and 
provide information continuously in our daily lives. Technology has enabled this to occur 
and has enabled them to become better aware and informed of issues. These expectations 
also require the timely flow of critical information be made available at a moment’s 
notice, twenty-four hours per day.  
The term communications is very broad. Is communication just information flow, 
or is it equipment, or is it the combination of both?  One might logically assume, in this 
survey of citizens expectations, that “communications” is information flow. Obtaining a 
status of the event and getting information is the expectation of the public. 
The current emphasis and massive expenditures to achieve interoperable 
communications may not be understood or accepted by the public. Based on their need 
for basic information flow, do they really care if responders can talk to each other? Their 
phone call to 9-1-1 initiates a timely response to their needs. Public expectations  
are focused on outcomes rather than the process necessary to provide a necessary 
outcome.    In a large-scale event, they are more concerned about information  
necessary to make their immediate life safety actions.   
The expectations of the essential services provided by the private sector is 
consistent with those currently delivered. The highest expectation, identified by 52 
participants, was food followed by shelter, water, and medical. Although these services 
are primarily provided by the private sector, there is a reliance on all levels of 
government to produce and provide this service. An expectation cannot be examined in 
isolation. The provision of providing food includes raw materials, processing, packaging, 
transportation, cooking, which in turn require facilities, personal, transportation and other  
 
                                                 
54 Report on August 14th Blackout, 80.  
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equipment. Many of these require electricity, fuel, and water as part of their operations. 
“Horizontal” planning may provide for a coordinated effort to ensure safe access to these 
facilities and prioritization in recovery efforts. 
If the public does not understand the role of the private sector, has government 
examined the interdependencies required to deliver and meet their current planning 
process?  Communities must understand the importance of this issue by thorough 
horizontal planning when considering how to meet expectations. What are the capabilities 
required to meet them and are they justified? Is government sending the wrong message 
to the public as part of their education programs?  Failure to plan forces the community to 
take unmanageable reactive measures if an event occurs. This can produce ineffective 
responses, as demonstrated in New Orleans, creating a loss of credibility for all levels of 
government.   
F. EXPECTATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 2003 NORTHEAST 
ELECTRICAL BLACKOUT 
St. Clair County can look at lessons learned from the 2003 Blackout that affected 
the county. Every public expectation was affected by this event especially feeding and 
medical. The three hospitals operated under backup power, clinics and physician offices 
could not operate. Almost every grocery store and restaurant could not open and 
sufficient losses due to food spoilage.  
Fortunately, with four electrical power plants located within the county, residents 
were without power for only one and one-half days. With warm summer days, abundant 
with daylight, residents were able to cope with the outage with minimal difficulty, as 
sheltering requirements were minimal. Several communities were brought back online 
within the first twenty four hours, enabling gasoline, food and other essential items to be 
available to other communities without power.  
The blackout was a result of a cascading critical infrastructure system failure. Had 
the failure resulted from widespread disaster damage such as downed poles and wires, 
emergency response agencies would have been overwhelmed and the outage would have 
been longer in duration, potentially challenging other essential services.  
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For local government, the guidance of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
National Infrastructure Protection Program and FEMA’s Planning Guidelines may seem 
sufficient when evaluating the blackout as it occurred. What if the outage had occurred in 
winter? What if it lasted several days or even weeks?  The impact on existing resources 
would be devastating if this incident had occurred in winter due to insufficient sheltering 
and feeding capabilities. Communities must examine the reliance of critical infrastructure 
interdependencies in their planning development. 
The planning fails once the incident scenario is examined in the same widespread 
area in cold weather conditions. Appendix 2 applies the five citizen expectations to the 
event. The comparison identifies similar issues with medical and communications in both 
seasons. Issues arise with the expectations for sheltering and feeding of the population. 
The occurrence of the blackout during the summer months provided the opportunity to 
cook meals outside on grills in comfortable temperatures. The lack of power creates 
additional feeding problems in cold weather as outside activity is limited. Sheltering 
requirements in warmer weather are minimized due to the ability to stay outside. Winter 
temperatures require protection against exposure to low temperatures making indoor 
shelter necessary. The responsibility for providing essential services is contained in 
governmental emergency plans. 
With the increasing potential for more major events, the identification of the 
expectations of all parties is necessary. Without a collaborative effort, government, 
private business, and the general public cannot share their expectations of essential 
services as the precursor to the development of an effective continuity program. A 
collaborative effort becomes a proactive rather than a reactive opportunity. 
Merriam-Webster defines proactive as “acting in anticipation of future problems, 
needs, or changes.”  When compared to the previously stated definition of expectation, 
there are close similarities. Both focus on acting now for the future. Until planning 
guidance addresses expectations in a proactive environment, the current delivery of 




failure to address expectations will leave communities vulnerable. After such an event, 
there will be a public outcry regarding the ineffective government response and the need 
for change.   
In St. Clair County, the public has identified five expectations of essential 
services when a large-scale event occurs. These expectations are: medical, shelter, food, 
water and communication. Some of these are provided by government and some by the 
private sector. It does not matter who provides the service, it is a service the public is 
accustomed to on a daily basis and the foundation for their life safety.  
Identifying expectations in advance will assist in planning efforts, especially 
when the planning guidance that communities utilize focuses on the continuity of 
operations within government. Government may create a continuity of operations plan for 
their provided services; however, it is clear that essential services extend far beyond their 
current planning guidance. In the current stove-pipe planning process, there are no 
assurances of planning interaction between sectors, potentially creating points of failure 
in a system reliant upon interdependencies.    Identifying the public expectations of these 
essential services enables the opportunity to evaluate the existing planning strategy as it 
applies to meeting those expectations. 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF ABILITY TO MEET EXPECTATIONS 
To be proactive, a community must understand the expectations of its citizens as 
well as examine their capability to meet those expectations. In most cases, there will be 
significant gaps between the two. This chapter will discuss capabilities and how the trust 
and confidence of government affects the public expectations of essential services. 
Without proper planning that includes the interdependencies of essential services, 
communities may not be able to meet these public expectations.  
Government provides essential services within their fiscal constraints on a daily 
basis with reasonable success. As demonstrated in Chapter III, it must be understood that 
public expectations of government in a disaster may not be those same services planned 
for continuity by government and infrastructure sectors. Several factors must be 
considered in the ability of a community to provide essential services that may or may 
not be able to meet public expectations.  If these services cannot be provided, does 
government have the expectation that the public needs to prepare themselves even more? 
Has this been communicated effectively? 
The ability to meet essential services expectations of citizens can be determined 
by the capabilities of the services that are provided by public and private sectors. Without 
a clear determination of capabilities, the gap between the expectations and the ability to 
delivery those essential services cannot be determined.   
A. CAPABILITIES 
Recent events have created the need to re-examine the risk and current strategy of 
organizations. The lessons of the recent past have shown that risk is dynamic; the types 
and magnitude of potential incidents that the nation confronts have changed.  It is now 
necessary for communities to truly quantify the gaps that exist in prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery capabilities, by reviewing their current all hazards risk profile and 
the impact of past and ongoing preparedness investments.  This approach must take into 
account public expectations, current state and local capabilities, federal capabilities, and 
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importantly, must be consistent with federal guidelines to determine the current status of 
preparedness and provide the ability of ensuring the delivery of essential services. 
Beyond preparedness, today’s society places strong emphasis on customer 
service, not only in the private sector but also by government for the private sector. 
Whether dining, shopping or entertainment, the capability to provide quality service is 
expected and the lack of a capability creates customer unhappiness and potential loss of 
business.   
In government, the unhappiness relates to loss of confidence and ultimately 
potential loss of support for funding various projects that may be an instrumental part of 
the overall strategy. Public managers are squeezed between budgetary constraints and the 
constant clamor for efficiency, on the one hand, and, on the other, demands to produce 
improved social outcomes from generations of stakeholders now conditioned to expect 
superior customer service in virtually every other aspect of their daily lives.”55   
The uniqueness of government as the sole provider of the service within a 
community is that competition does not drive the level of service. If citizen expectations 
are not identified, government delivers services according to budgetary considerations 
and their own perception of the level of service necessary. The commitment and the 
delivery of a quality service that meets a community’s needs is a key to maintaining 
community trust and confidence.  
B. WHAT ARE THE EXISTING CAPABILITIES AND WHERE ARE WE 
SPENDING OUR MONEY? 
1. Federal Guidance 
The National Preparedness Goal defines what it means for the nation to be 
prepared by providing a vision for preparedness, establishing national priorities and 
identifying target capabilities.56 The plan adopted a Capabilities-Based Planning process 
                                                 
55 Greg Parston, “Unleashing Public-Service Value Through Innovation,” Outlook, May 2007, 1. 
56 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List 2.0: A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal. Draft. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2005): iii. 
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supported by three planning tools which includes the Target Capabilities List.57 DHS 
provided the Target Capabilities List (TCL) to assist communities in evaluating their 
capabilities.  
The TCL provides a guide for development of a national network of capabilities 
that will be available when and where they are needed to prevent, protect against and 
respond to, and recover from major events.58  Phase One of the TCL, which is designed 
for response, is a process-oriented document containing thirty-seven capabilities. A 
second phase oriented toward prevention and preparedness is currently being developed. 
The TCL provides guidelines for assessment of capabilities, identifying and 
understanding public expectations is an important factor in the assessment process.   
The capabilities assume local jurisdictions have an operational level of required 
capabilities to address most routine emergencies and disasters, such as routine fire and 
law enforcement services or seasonal flooding.59  The TCL addresses unique capabilities 
and incremental resources required for terrorism, very large-scale disasters, pandemic 
health emergencies, and other major incidents.60  These resources may not be located 
within a community but available from outside sources. 
Extended Regional Collaboration is identified as an overarching priority in the 
National Preparedness Goal in recognition that large-scale events will require a shared 
response across jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public/private sectors.61  
Standardization of geographic regions will enable coordination of preparedness activities 
more effectively, spread costs, pool resources, share risk, and thereby increase the overall 
return on investment.62  
 
                                                 
57 Target Capabilities List 2.0, iii. 
58 Ibid., v. 
59 Ibid., 5. 
60 Ibid, 1. 
61 Ibid., 14. 
62 Ibid, 14. 
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Utilizing a standard tool within a nationwide network is an excellent vision. 
However, in a major event that affects numerous jurisdictions and states, the true reality 
is a community is or can be on their own for a period of days prior to receiving outside 
services. As essential services span the private and public sectors, a collaborative 
understanding of the expectations of all partners must be placed on the table and shared 
by all.  
2. County  
The blackout of 2003 provided the opportunity for St. Clair County to redefine 
their planning process. Although the occurrence was in the warm summer months, the 
Homeland Security – Emergency Management Office studied the effects of the incident 
as if it had also occurred in cold winter months. This is listed in Appendix 2. It 
demonstrated that the existing paper plan did outline responsibilities and the agencies 
required for such an incident, but would not be effective in a countywide or regional 
event.  
The plan did not address capabilities, continuity of essential services, or a strong 
prevention/preparedness component. After action discussions identified these as 
deficiencies that required change. Until the blackout, the primary focus of county 
planning centered on response to hazardous materials incidents.  
Planning for the cold weather blackout initially produced two primary 
expectations that the public would have. The expectations of shelter and food became the 
initial planning focus. The St. Clair County survey confirmed these two as important 
public expectations. A review of the existing shelter program indicated approximate 90 
percent of the identified shelters lacked backup power to provide warmth to those 
requiring shelter. Shelter plan guidance is designed for the single incident response and if 
necessary, utilization of sheltering in adjacent communities.  
St. Clair County HSEM then realized the necessity for resilience to be an 
integrated part of the planning process. The local community provides certain essential 
services but is reliant on a network of interdependencies for other essential and support 
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services.  The blackout of 2003 demonstrated that failure within this network could leave 
widespread areas isolated for extended periods of time. Minimizing the effects of an 
incident places less burden on local resources and allows the community to recover 
faster. 
Currently absent is the ability to identify the expectations of the public, 
consequently government expectations and needs are utilized to determine grant 
allocations and expenditures. Governmental agencies in St. Clair County have identified 
the need for an interoperable radio system since the early 1990s. Overcrowded 
frequencies and the inability to communicate between disciplines has been a consistent 
identified deficiency in annual exercises. This deficiency affects almost every aspect of 
the Incident Management System utilized by communities creating additional 
deficiencies in the delivery of essential services. 
The identified solution was to integrate into the State of Michigan’s 800 MHz 
radio system. This system meets the expectations of the emergency response personnel in 
dealing with emergencies; however, it lacks the support of the citizens. Citizens refused 
to pass a ballot proposal in 1996 to fund the project. Government and emergency 
response personnel insisted that the project be implemented and, for several years, the 
majority of Homeland Security grant dollars have been utilized for a phased integration 
into the system. This is consistent with the identification of interoperable 
communications as an overarching priority in the National Preparedness Goal. 
The grant funding and issuance of a bond have provided funding to complete 
approximately 80 percent of the system. A 2007 ballot funding request was soundly 
defeated by the public that voiced concerns over an additional tax and the lack of trust in 
government, thus leaving the county with an 80 percent functioning radio system. This in 
turn jeopardizes the ability to deliver essential services that would meet public 
expectations in a large scale event. 
Grant dollars have been also utilized to improve other capabilities. The 
capabilities that the government has also put some emphasis on are consistent with the 
Target Capabilities contained within the TCL. They include Responder Health and Safety 
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and WMD Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.  Both capabilities do not 
align with the citizen expectations but are consistent with the identified risk to the county. 
Applying the majority of grant dollars to the Interoperability Communications 
project has created the inability to fund other potential solutions that would meet the 
expectations of the public.  Are government desires to build a reliable, functioning radio 
system consistent with meeting citizen expectations? In the current environment, citizens 
say no and government says yes. The decision for utilization of grant dollar allocation has 
been primarily determined by the emergency responders but the public argument is that 
government’s goals that will help meet citizen’s expectations have not been 
communicated effectively. 
The St. Clair County survey identified five essential services that the public 
expects in a major event. These five expectations are consistent with the Target 
Capabilities contained within the TCL and are included in Mass Care, Medical Surge, 
and Emergency Public Information and Warning. The current planning process provides 
the opportunity for the county to address each of these expectations, yet it is not clear 
whether these expectations are the ones on which the county is currently focused.  
The St. Clair County survey identified that medical issues were the highest 
expectation of an essential service. The survey also asked how confident the public is of 
the healthcare system responding effectively to a large-scale event. The results indicated 
that 47 percent were either not, or less, confident that the system would respond 
effectively.  
Table 2.   Public confidence of health care system in large scale event. 
Not 
Confident       Very Confident Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incomplete 
Answers 
Number  41 44 44 36 13 2 
Percentage 23% 24% 24% 20% 7% 1% 
 
In the county, the majority of the medical services are provided by the private 
sector. Government agencies have minimal resources to address this and must rely 
primarily on the private sector.   
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Other assessments of medical/health agency preparedness across the nation 
identify serious shortfalls similar to St. Clair County. In a Columbia University survey, 
only 27 percent of those surveyed were very confident or confident that our health 
systems are prepared for a large-scale event, but show a steady decline in the confidence 
of our public health system to respond to an act of terrorism from 53 percent in 2002 to 
39 percent in 2004.63  
The lack of confidence in the current health system within St. Clair County, in 
addition to the high expectation for medical care, should be a warning flag for 
government. The health care system in St. Clair County is challenged by medical surge 
on a daily basis. Plans have been implemented and exercised to reduce the population by 
10 percent to address medical surge. Difficulty in obtaining sufficient staff for daily 
operations, let alone extended sustainment, is an issue facing all three hospitals.  
Efforts to improve health system preparedness continue through the federal grant 
programs. The Health and Human Services Department (HHS) has a grant process for the 
hospital, pre-hospital and health disciplines to address medical surge needs, along with 
numerous health response planning issues. Committees of these disciplines were formed 
with by-laws, goals and objectives, exercising requirements along with other issues being 
addressed.  DHS also has a grant program that includes all disciplines that also have by-
laws, goals and objectives. Issues that are substantially broader, however, address 
medical surge and other issues that are contained within the HHS grant. 
This continued stove-pipe grant planning process creates difficulty at the local 
level. HHS grant management teams are not consistent with the DHS teams, which 
creates confusion and some duplication of effort. With limited resources to address 
numerous risks, including health emergencies, a community cannot afford to plan in a 
stove-pipe manner with any hope of either meeting citizen expectations or even clarifying 
where services actually originate.  
                                                 
63 Columbia University Study, “How Americans Feel About Terrorism and Security: Three years after 
September 11,” November 2004.  
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3. Gap 
The potential for significant improvement in a communities planning process 
utilizing the TCL exists. Yet the strong focus on regional asset and planning to meet the 
National Preparedness Goal deters preparedness at the local, individual jurisdiction level. 
The current grant allocation process builds upon the regionalization and capabilities 
within the TCL. This process moves the previous stove-pipe grant allocation, which 
enabled counties to receive direct grant funding to a regional level.  
Reduced grant funding is now allocated based on regional planning with the goal 
of improving capabilities to reduce risk at that regional level. Capabilities from within a 
region may be sufficient in an overall response to a significant incident, or several 
incidents, as the current planning process calls for. What occurs if the incident is so 
widespread that resources are not available? Will neighboring states have resources 
available, and, if so, when? 
St. Clair County has implemented regionalization into the county planning 
process through the creation of five planning districts for coordination centers. The 
continued planning emphasis is at the local jurisdiction level to address the “you are on 
your own” concept for a 72-hour period. The true understanding of expectations and the 
delivery of essential services must center on this concept. In other words, resources from 
outside the community cannot be expected and the community must proactively address 
individual, not regional, community capabilities to meet the expectations of the public. 
Lacking from the planning process is emphasis on the interdependencies that are 
required to provide essential services.  This requires a network operation that can sustain 
damage and continue to function or recover in minimal time. Key components to 
providing essential services that the public expects may be located within a local 
community. The current grant allocation process cannot continue to be directed entirely 




them to close local gaps. The inability of local communities to fund the necessary 
improvements to the current capabilities will widen the gap in government’s ability to 
meet the expectations of the public. 
The effort to close the gap to meet the medical expectations by the public has not 
been effectively met by the current grant and planning process.  Lacking is the integration 
of the two separate funding and planning mechanisms, (DHS and HHS,) into one 
planning strategy.  Government planning efforts must fully incorporate the private sector 
into a seamless effort as the majority of capabilities are provided by that sector. 
The current government response plan assigns the responsibility of shelter 
operations to an outside agency. Public expectation identifies government and the private 
sector as providing sheltering.  The inability of government to close this gap has been the 
reliance on the private sector and failure to recognize the interdependencies required to 
support shelter expectations. This lack of recognition directly affects the capability to 
meet public expectations.  
The public expectation of food is not being adequately addressed by government. 
Current planning assigns the responsibility of feeding to an outside volunteer agency. The 
lack of a capability assessment that incorporates the numerous interdependencies is 
required to establish an effective feeding program.  
Water is an essential expectation that must be provided to sustain life and the 
provision of services. Current planning addresses the ability to meet the expectations of 
residents within a community to provide necessary water during an emergency event. 
Lacking is an assessment on the essential services requiring water to operate, the length 
of time they can operate on existing supplies, and the effects on services if operations are 
ceased.  
Government has the responsibility to provide communications to the public and 
relies on private sector resources to deliver those communications. There has been some 
progress in providing the public with the necessary communications through 
technological purchases.  
 38
The St. Clair County survey provided five essential services the public expects 
during a large-scale event. In the evaluation of the current efforts to meet those 
expectations, the county has done a less-than-average job of addressing those 
expectations; the primary focus has been communications, but mostly for emergency 
responders, not to communicate to the public. The public expectations identified will 
require a proactive planning approach through a public–private partnership and a change 
in policy. This will be a difficult challenge in a reactive, response-oriented culture.  
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V.  OTHER CHALLENGES IN MEETING EXPECTATIONS 
“The primary goal of every city in America is to be a safe city, a place where 
residents feel safe, secure, and confident that local leaders know what to do in case of 
emergency.”64   This is an expectation of the residents of our communities who pay taxes 
for several of the essential services necessary to perform this task. The security of their 
homes, businesses, friends and family are entrusted to the government. 
When identifying the ability of government’s effort to meet the expectations of 
the public, several other challenges were identified. Trust and confidence in government 
is an important factor when concerning preparedness and funding efforts. The current 
stove pipe planning restricts the identification of the interdependencies required to 
provide essential services. The inability to provide essential services creates the need of 
the public to prepare themselves for events. All of this must be considered in the future 
planning process in order to match the government capabilities to the public expectations. 
A. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
A possible detriment to meeting expectations may be trust and confidence in 
government. Trust and confidence are key issues in delivering essential services that need 
to be addressed by every unit of government, private sector and every resident. Without 
trust, projects and processes can be slowed down or even destroyed.  The lack in 
confidence in the government could conceivably be a motivating factor for preparedness. 
However, ‘‘even as people perceive government to be failing in its effort to prepare the 
country, it has a depressing impact on the public’s motivation to get prepared.’’65  
Having trust and confidence in disaster preparedness efforts is essential to an effective 
public-private community oriented planning process.   
                                                 
64 National League of Cities, “Homeland Security: Practical Tools for Local Governments,”  
November 2002, 2. 
65 Anthony Ramirez, “Polls Shop Drop in Assurance Since the Attacks of Sept. 11,” New York Times, 
September 8, 2006.  
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The public’s confidence in the government to respond adequately to a terrorist 
attack, natural disaster or public health emergency has dropped sharply since the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.66 Throughout the nation, trust and confidence in 
our government is extremely low.67 This is far more reaching than national security and 
disaster management. However, a recent survey indicated that governmental response to 
the hurricanes added to the drop in confidence level. Fewer than half of those surveyed 
said they thought the government is “very prepared” to deal with this year’s hurricane 
season. Only half agreed that the federal government had “learned a lesson from 
Hurricane Katrina” — which swamped New Orleans, killing more than fifteen hundred 
people and displacing hundreds of thousands more — “and the nation is better prepared 
for a major disaster as a result.” More than four in ten respondents said the government 
had not learned anything.68 
Regarding Katrina-related matters, more than half of the survey’s respondents (53 
percent) said the government’s handling of the hurricane had a negative impact on their 
confidence in government overall. Only 13 percent said it had a positive impact and 28 
percent said it had no impact.69   
In each community, there are a percentage of prepared residents and unprepared 
residents. What prevents those individuals from preparing?  Is it the issue of trust, lack of 
education, financial issues or does perception of risk drive preparedness?  If a large-scale 
event occurs, is the confidence of local government and the emergency response system 
important to community preparedness, or would the lack of confidence in the emergency  
response system and the realization that their expectations may not be met, motivate 
                                                 
66 Anthony Ramirez, “Polls Show Drop in Assurance Since the Attacks of September 11.” New York 
Times, September 8, 2006. 
67 Lewis J. Perelman, “Shifting Security Paradigms: Toward Resilience,” Critical Thinking: Moving 
from Infrastructure Protection to Infrastructure Resiliency, Arlington, VA: George Mason University, 
School of Law (February 2007), 35. 
68 National survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, The Washington Post Company, August 21, 
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/20/AR2006082000535.html 
(accessed February 13, 2006).  
69 National survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, Washington Post. 
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residents to prepare themselves? In both cases, there will be the prepared and unprepared 
all having certain expectations of essential services. 
These issues are important, but to effectively prepare, there must be an 
understanding of risk and what are the essential services and expectations of them by the 
public. Understanding the risk that a community faces is problematic to both the public 
and private sectors. Local communities are faced with a system that does not have a 
consistent risk assessment methodology, which leads to flawed or non-effective strategies 
in the development of capabilities that enable the delivery of effective essential services.  
Without this knowledge in advance to plan, the potential for failure increases once 
the incident occurs and the emergency response system reacts. The nation watched as 
hundreds of New Orleans residents expecting to be sheltered, stood helplessly without 
food and water for several days as the existing planning process failed. Those failed 
services are the same as expected by the public as identified in the St. Clair County 
expectations survey.  
B. IS THE CURRENT PLANNING PROCESS EFFECTIVE? 
Identifying the public expectations of these essential services enables the 
opportunity to evaluate the existing planning strategy as it applies to meeting those 
expectations. Since the watershed event of 9/11, the hard security path followed by the 
U.S. government has given substantially higher priority to terrorist threats than to other 
kinds of threats or risks.70  DHS and other related federal agency programs have centered 
on physical and cyber security preventive measures.71 This demonstrates the nation’s 
continuation of a reactive measure to events.  
Despite the warning provided as a result of the failures demonstrated by the 
power blackout of 2003, and the more recent natural disasters, strategic guidance related 
to critical infrastructure has continued to focus on mitigation of the terrorist threat.72 This 
                                                 
70 Perelman, “Shifting Security Paradigms,” 26. 
71 Paula L. Scalingi, Moving Beyond Critical Infrastructure Protection to Disaster Resilience 
(February 2007), 53. 
72 DHS Report to the Critical Infrastructure Task Force (Washington, D.C.: January 2006) 3. 
 42
is despite the Presidential Directive HSPD-8 emphasizing all hazards preparedness. The 
conceptual design for this policy thrust is based on protection that has been embodied in 
DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), largely focused on protection of 
“critical infrastructure and key resources” (CI/KR)73  The NIPP’s top-down/federally-
driven and public resource/grant funding focus has resulted in process rather than a 
capability focused, sector-based and committee intensive, effort that fails to include the 
expertise of community officials. 
This type of planning often results in a checklist, or boiler-type, planning and 
response format to deal with different types or categories of risk as different problems 
that then require a different set of solutions. This creates risk stovepipes and causes 
increased risk exposure that cascades across the public and private sectors in complex 
ways.  With individual stovepipes, the potential for overlapping planning and response 
efforts will occur. Former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge recognized the fundamental 
weakness of stovepipes in relation to information sharing and expressed the need to 
eliminate this by stating,  
We’re going to knock down the information ‘stovepipes’ throughout 
government and turn them into pipelines. That’s one reason why we 
created the Homeland Security Advisory System. One lesson of 9/11 is 
that when information doesn’t get to the right people in time, it can be just 
as dangerous as when it falls into the wrong hands.74 
Planning prior to an incident is essential but it cannot be done in isolation. 
Unfortunately the federal-oriented stove-pipe planning and information sharing approach 
focuses on a sector-based system that creates the environment of isolation within a 
community rather than a cohesive interacting system. Local communities form the 
committees established by the grant requirements and must work within those 
requirements for funding. This continues to demonstrate the stove-pipe approach is 
solidly entrenched down to the local level. There must be a change to a cohesive 
interacting system that leads into the further development of community continuity 
                                                 
73  Scalingi,” Moving Beyond Critical Infrastructure,” 53. 
74 Tom Ridge, Director of Homeland Security, Associated Press Annual Luncheon, April 29, 2003.  
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planning to ensure a community can minimize and recover quicker from the effects of an 
incident. This last concept is also called resiliency. 
The planning process has focused on single events affecting a community, which 
allows the utilization of surrounding resources to mitigate the incident. Scenarios are 
created to utilize existing and/or mutual aid resources and to demonstrate acceptable 
preparedness levels with limited deficiencies. The emergency management plans of these 
public and private sector infrastructures and essential service providers are, at best, 
adequate to address localized incidents and events.75 
Community plans do not take into account disasters with extensive and prolonged 
impacts that may include destruction of critical components, systems and facilities, 
causing outages of weeks or months and shortages of personnel and expertise to restore 
critical services.76  Large-scale multi-jurisdictional exercises very seldom occur due to 
the planning guidance that focused on individual communities rather than multi-
jurisdictional events. 
The lack of large-scale planning and exercising was clearly demonstrated as the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left the Gulf Coast in desperate need of resources and 
assistance.  Nearly a quarter of a million people in shelters relied on shipments of ice, 
food, and water to meet their basic needs.77 FEMA simply could not procure enough 
resources to match the rate at which commodities were being consumed.  The agency’s 
contracts with private companies, though sufficient for smaller disasters, were incapable 
of supplying the enormous quantities of resources needed.78 
This failure demonstrates the need to address homeland security and emergency 
preparedness at the regional and local levels for the simple reason that when disaster 
                                                 
75 Scalingi, “Moving Beyond Critical Infrastructure,” 49 
76 Ibid. 
77 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 
2005. 
78 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before 
a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 
27, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
109th Congress, 1st session, 49-50. 
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strikes, the major burden of response and recovery is on local authorities involving local 
response.79  With limited resources within communities, would regionalization or multi-
jurisdictional planning be beneficial — or is the reality of “you are on your own for 
seventy-two hours” more reasonable? 
Historically, the American governance system, divided into federal, state, and 
local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for addressing public policy issues 
from a regional multi-jurisdictional perspective.  The autonomy of local jurisdictions and 
competing priorities within and among them can make regional coordination difficult.80 
Incentives and guidelines that move this planning process forward may be required to 
ensure the right players are involved. Moreover, the success of other regional 
collaborations must be reviewed to determine whether these examples could be 
appropriated to address homeland security issues. Until this happens, the nation will 
continue down the path where individual agencies and jurisdictions prepare and respond 
to disasters on their own terms.81 
With only federal planning recommendations and the voluntary NFPA standard to 
follow, local communities and states are also not compelled to ensure the continuity of 
the services it provides. Existing plans may conceptually identify the need, but lack the 
detail to ensure the dependencies and deliverables from numerous assets are addressed. 
Furthermore, our current approach to response planning does not sufficiently 
acknowledge how adjoining communities and regions can and do support each other.82 
For example, there is wide disparity in emergency response capabilities across the  
 
 
                                                 
79 Brandon J.  Hardenbrook, “The Need for a Policy Framework to Develop Disaster Resilient 
Regions.” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management   2, no. 3 (2005): 15.  
80 United States Government Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, House of Representatives Homeland Security Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance 
Emergency Preparedness(Washington, DC: GAO-04-1009): 8.  
81 Hardenbrook, The Need for a Policy Framework, 1. 
82 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned, 67. 
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country’s local jurisdictions.83 Yet we currently lack the means to assess and track what 
these disparities are and, consequently, how we must plan to account for them in a 
crisis.84  
C. INTERDEPENDENCIES 
Critical to essential services in any preparedness or response activity, correct 
resources are required to effectively address the issue.  In a planning approach, this is 
also very important. In regional planning and collaboration efforts, resources are the key 
components of the community, including the private sector. Expectations of the delivered 
governmental services are dependent upon numerous private-sector partners, including 
the citizens themselves. 
 
Figure 1.   Network of interdependencies. 
 
This is an example of interdependencies in society today.85 It provides examples 
of various sectors and supports the need for horizontal planning rather that vertical sector 
                                                 
83 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned, 67. 
84 Ibid., 67. 
85 Michigan Public Safety Commission. Report on August 14th Blackout, 71. 
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planning. In addressing interdependencies, there must be collaboration that includes an 
understanding the community may not be the location of the incident, yet needs to 
respond to the resource expectations from another community.  The effective alignment 
of resources for the security of communities should require planning across jurisdictional 
boundaries; neighboring jurisdictions may be affected by an emergency situation in many 
potential ways — from the implementation of mutual aid agreements, to accepting 
evacuated residents, to traffic disruptions.86 
Communities may face the reduction or limitation of resources available to them. 
In some instances, state and local governments and responders may become victims 
themselves, prohibiting their ability to identify, request, receive, or deliver assistance, 
significantly affecting the expectations for essential services. This is the moment of major 
crisis — the moment when 9-1-1 calls are no longer answered; the moment when 
hurricane victims can no longer be timely evacuated or evacuees can no longer find 
shelter; the moment when police no longer patrol the streets, and the rule of law begins to 
break down.87  
Expectations that the preparedness and dedication of the key essential services 
personnel to the public comes before their personal needs may pose a false sense of 
security and affect individual preparedness efforts. Failure for key personnel to 
adequately prepare their families may reduce the level of services provided. There were 
numerous gaps in essential services after the hurricane as some responders placed 
personal needs before their professional commitment.88 A Council for Excellence in 
Government survey indicated that 65 percent of responders believe their agencies are 
only somewhat prepared to respond if disaster strikes.”89 This supports an even further 
need for preparedness planning to overcome response shortfalls. 
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The St. Clair County Survey found that medical assistance was of importance to 
all three groups. If the public concern centers on medical surge, do the current grant 
allocations place a high emphasis on this?  Through the 2006 grant process, the Health 
Grant has been utilized to address the shortfalls of medical surge. The Urban Area 
Security Initiative has ignored the medical issues and focused on response issues for 
police and fire. Recommendations that would address four of the five public expectations 
have either been ignored or failed to be presented. Only interoperable communications 
systems for first responders and public warning systems have been addressed. 
Public–private collaboration is essential to reduce those competing priorities as 
many communities share the same essential services. More recently, businesses have 
begun to adopt resilience as their over-arching objective, which implies an ability to 
adapt to changing environmental conditions more generally — not only to the direct 
impacts of a disaster.  According to a 2002 paper by Gartner,  
. . .enterprises are taking on the new challenge of deliberately designing 
resilience into their management of people, places, infrastructure, and 
work processes.”  The paper goes on to say that:  “Business resilience 
emerges through business, corporate and IT leaders deliberately working 
together across geographical, functional, business and decision-making 
boundaries to build an organization that rebounds, adjusts quickly and 
resumes operations. 90  
Understanding interdependencies is an important part of the planning process in 
order to address the expectations of the public. The utilization of horizontal planning for 
risk and capability assessment allows for a clear understanding by the providers of 
essential services of the level of preparedness within that community. Comparing the 
preparedness level to the expectations for essential services will allow for the plan to then 
address the expectations of the citizens to meet the shortfalls of essential services within 
the community.  Are the citizens willing to accept more personal responsibility, or will 
the providers of essential services be expected to do more? 
                                                 
90 “The Blueprint for the Resilient Virtual Organization,” Gartner, Inc., 2002, ID Number:  AV-15-
0894, 2. 
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D. CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS 
Public perception is that services such as police, fire and EMS are the first 
responders in an emergency situation. The reality is that citizens themselves are the true 
first responders. Whether a Midwest tornado or the Oklahoma City bombing, citizens 
provided immediate assistance to the victims and potential victims prior to the arrival of 
emergency services. Citizen involvement is an expectation of both the public and private 
sectors in preparedness and response planning in our communities. Citizen preparedness 
is critical in the planning process; however, is the current focus effective?   
Taxpayers are currently bankrolling a rapid-reaction military force that is 
able to deploy to any part of the globe within eighteen hours. But as a 
general rule, the White House has been telling communities that they 
should not count on receiving emergency federal assistance for at least 
seventy-two hours.91 
The government-based “Ready” program is an attempt to institute behavior 
changes at the individual level. The campaign focuses on preparing individuals for a 
period of seventy-two hours, with necessities such as food, water, radio, and flashlight, in 
the event responders cannot provide essential services in a timely manner.92  Those vital 
items directly relate to reducing the burden on essential services provided by public and 
private sectors during a large-scale event. 
Guidance in determining the level of citizen preparedness is available in the DHS 
Target Capabilities List (TCL). St. Clair County’s ability to meet citizen preparedness 
capabilities as outlined in the TCL would require the county to prepare 80 percent of the 
170,000 residents.93  The total of the 80 percent is 136,000, and results of the St. Clair 
County survey, 41.3 percent (70,210), indicated a level of preparedness. The additional 
number of residents requiring preparedness training would be 65,790. To meet this, using 
the recommended rate of 5 percent (3,375) of the citizens per year being trained, it would 
take just over nineteen years to reach the recommended 80 percent level. 
                                                 
91 Flynn, Edge of Disaster,170. 
92 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List. 111. 
93 Ibid. 
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This is an unrealistic timeframe to address the risk posed by major events faced 
by communities. There is great difficulty attempting behavior changes. After Hurricane 
Katrina, studies showed the number of individuals staying relatively consistent or even 
dropping. 
 
• Does your household have an emergency supply kit at home to be used 
only in the case of an emergency disaster? 94  (pre: 50 percent, post: 46 
percent)   
 
• Does your family emergency preparedness plan include at least two days 
of food and water, a flashlight, a portable radio and spare batteries, 
emergency phone numbers, and a meeting place for family members in 
case of evacuation?95 (pre: 30 percent,  post: 31 percent) 
 
The decision-making process of an individual requiring to take action will be 
based on their thoughts regarding past, present, or future intentions. Those who utilize the 
past often may have limited exposure to a major event as all incidents previously 
experienced were mostly small, localized events.  They utilize memories from 
experiences to take the appropriate course of action such as the previous experience 
wasn’t that bad and we are still here today. Whether a positive or negative memory of an 
experience, this could be the tipping point for someone to become better prepared. 
Individuals who are present oriented take immediate actions based on the 
situation and do not think about the consequences of their actions. People who make 
decisions based on present-oriented thinking will be difficult to change. Rather 
concentrate on behavior, policy change to their environment may create an improved 
safety barrier that ensures the delivery of essential services, would reduce situations 
requiring actions.  Those individuals who look to the future anticipate the consequences 
and prepare by actions such as stocking supply kits, heeding evacuation messages, and 
possibly leadership to influence others to increase preparedness efforts. 
                                                 
94 “A Post-Katrina Assessment,” Citizen Preparedness Review 2 (Spring 2006): 5.   
95 Ibid. 
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A question regarding workplace emergency preparedness kits was asked in the St. 
Clair County survey and a breakdown of those having kits indicates the majority of those 
kits do not contain food and water.  
Table 3.   St. Clair County workplace preparedness kits. 
Item Has item in kit Has kit but not item 
Food and Water 22 53
Portable Radio 40 35
First Aid Kit 67 8
Flashlight 53 22
Spare Batteries 45 30
   
Providing essential services in a large-scale event may require continuous 
operation for several days if not weeks. These results indicate that the private sector 
preparedness levels are very limited and must rely on outside resources for food to 
maintain operations. The need for planning that addresses continuous uninterrupted 
supply of essential services for all critical agencies is essential. 
There is willingness for citizens to become involved as 62 percent of Americans 
have indicated a desire to volunteer time to support emergency services within their 
community.96 The need for involvement is supported by 86 percent of emergency first 
responders recognizing a need for citizen involvement in their communities.97 In some 
disciplines, labor agreements prohibit the use of volunteers, protecting positions rather 
than delivering expected levels of service. The ability to determine the shortfalls that 
could be supplemented by citizen volunteers is necessary to improve capabilities.  
Citizen preparedness reduces the burden on the response system, however, 
without the capabilities of the community identified and addressed; there is still the issue 
of handling the other 50 or so percent of the non-prepared community. Lacking is the 
                                                 
96 The Center for Excellence in Government. From the Home Front to the Front Lines: 5. 
97 Ibid., 43.  
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proactive campaign to change the policies of the nation to ensure these essential services 
can continue or quickly return to operation during or after an incident.  
Communities must identify their level of capabilities in determining what to 
prepare for. The lack of capability may require citizen or volunteer participation. The 
current national Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) program is extremely 
beneficial to hurricane- or earthquake-prone areas. Yet the existing curriculum is less 
beneficial to other areas of the nation that do not face those threats and should not be 
adopted as a one solution answer to all 
If volunteerism or citizen participation is important to communities, establishing 
trust and confidence is the foundation in developing acceptable programs for the public.  
The need for a change in culture to reflect preparedness by developing policy  would 
begin to create a desire of the public to create safer communities by ensuring that 
essential resources can and will be delivered in a timely manner. The policy would focus 
on resilience as opposed to protection as the standard for planning in our nation and 
communities.   
Both government and the critical infrastructure sectors must ensure their ability to 
provide continuous service. The St. Clair County survey indicated that a three-day supply 
of food and water were the least items present in the number of disaster supply kits in 
businesses. If the facility provides or supports an essential service, continuity is lacking 
and the facility becomes dependent on the already overwhelmed system. If that system 
cannot support the facility, then the product that supports essential services is not 
provided, further disrupting capabilities.  
Current planning guidance continues to focus on a single event driven in a vertical 
or stove-pipe process. As government attempts to implement a form of horizontal 
planning utilizing regional planning and asset sharing, it continues to ignore the tipping 
point of an incident.  That tipping point is where the incident is widespread and 
overwhelms regional resources leaving individual communities on their own. The 
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VI.  WHERE “HORIZONTAL” OR “NETWORK PLANNING CAN 
CLOSE THE GAP 
After a major incident “lessons learned” are often identified in after action 
reports. The same lessons are identified incident after incident.  If we 
don’t learn these lessons, people will get hurt because we failed to fix 
problems that hurt them the last time. 
     MIPT – Lessons We Don’t Learn98 
 
Everyone has expectations of the essential services that are provided in normal 
everyday life or in dealing with a major event. In the world today it must be realized one 
cannot be protected from everything, and essential needs are a complexity of 
interdependencies that are not confined to one company, community or even state. 
Constant delivery of those services is expected and required to maintain a quality of life, 
which, if disrupted, causes issues and the potential for chaos in life.  
“We have a tradition here in the United States and elsewhere in the world of only 
addressing issues concerning disaster preparedness and mitigation after we have 
experienced some calamity.”99  A change in culture to a proactive prepared society 
through a collaborated, horizontally-based, public and private planning effort is required. 
“The world is becoming turbulent faster than organizations can become resilient.”100  The 
nation can no longer operate on the premise of protection-oriented planning. 
The current protection-oriented planning creates a point of failure.  If the 
protection fails, everything fails. The World Trade Center supposedly met the protection 
factors. An unconventional adversary, however, was able to destroy the twin towers by 
                                                 
98 Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy,  Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them. National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (March 8, 2007).  
99 Eric Holdeman, Director, King County Office of Emergency Management, Testimony to Senate 
Committee: Government Operations and Elections, January 11, 2005, 4. 
100 Gary Hamel and Lisa Valikanges, “The Quest for Resilience.” Harvard Business Review, 
September 2003, 1. 
 54
commandeering airplanes with box cutters.  The attack on the twin towers demonstrated 
the cascading damages to critical infrastructure and essential services  
You know protection is where we tend to focus in Government, but it is 
very, very clear that protection is not enough and in a world of imperfect 
[intelligence and] intelligence sharing, we have to look at the ability of 
critical infrastructure particularly cyber infrastructure to sustain damage 
and be quickly restored.101 
Is a change to the current method of planning and expectations of delivering 
essential services needed? Insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination 
are not problems that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina.102 We can do better.  
1.  Proactive, Collaboration Environment 
It is essential in the twenty-first century that the public and private sector achieve 
the ability to manage emerging risks and anticipate the interactions between different 
types of risk in their strategies. Understanding the risk issue and creating the ability to 
recover quickly with minimal effect will enhance the continuity of services provided and 
lower the expectations of all involved parties. Creating a proactive environment that 
focuses on prevention and preparedness will enable the community to reduce the 
demands placed on essential services by unprepared citizens.  
Preparedness, therefore, must emphasize the importance of flexibility and 
readiness to cope with an uncertain future. While we cannot predict the future to our 
satisfaction, we can build capabilities that prepare us for a broad range of challenges. 
Perhaps equally important, we can ensure that our preparedness plans, thinking, and 
“imagination” do not become so rigid that we cannot rapidly adapt to unforeseen 
challenges.103 William Pelfrey states that collaboration has been called “the most 
essential element in the cycle of preparedness.”104 
                                                 
101 Jeffrey Gaynor, “Critical Infrastructure Resilience,” Defence Management Journal 34 (2006) 148.  
102 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 50. 
103  The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 79. 
104 William V. Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for 
Terrorist Threats,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no 1 (2005): 8. 
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When there is private-public collaboration, a network can be established. The 
basic definition of a network is a collection of nodes and links that connect pairs of 
nodes.105 The essence is in collaboration; the links are the ways to connect the people, 
facilities, etc. (nodes) together. In building a network, trust is the key element in 
successful collaboration and partnerships.106 It is essential that truth is provided in a way 
that leaves the right impression. Too often, government assures the public that they are 
prepared, only to become overwhelmed — as in the hurricane — and lose the confidence 
of the public. Utilizing horizontal or network planning broadens the integrity necessary 
by demonstrating harmony in the values and intent of the program.  
The purpose or plan must be presented in a manner that clearly identifies the 
motive for implementation.  Understanding the contents and expectations of the plan will 
assist in the acceptance and implementation. The strength of a horizontal-based 
partnership helps show that there is caring and truth without a hidden agenda, and it will 
build confidence and trust. 
It is important to have the capabilities necessary for implementation.  Even with a 
clear understanding and acceptance of a project, the inability to deliver will erode 
confidence and create a lack of commitment. Success through results is important to the 
process of trust. Results will strengthen credibility and support the integrity of the project 
and the organization. 
Lacking national guidance, some public and private sectors are attempting 
forward planning efforts. The need to address homeland security and emergency 
preparedness in a collaborative horizontal system at the regional and local levels still has 
increasingly become more apparent in the past few years, for the simple reason that when 
disaster strikes, the major burden of response and recovery is on local authorities.107 Top- 
 
 
                                                 
105 Ted G. Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation,” Wiley Interscience, New Jersey  2006,  78. 
106 John Arquilla, “It Takes a Network,” Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2002. 
107 Hardenbrook, “The Need for a Policy Framework,” 1.  
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down planning processes must be redesigned to allow for more bottom-up, locally based 
innovation and experimentation. In a diverse and rapidly changing state, a one-size-fits-
all approach will not work.108 
2.   Regional Efforts 
In cases where state and local traditions do not encourage inter-jurisdictional 
collaboration, more prescriptive requirements regarding regional group members, 
decision-making processes, and planning can establish minimum thresholds for those 
activities and may provide an incentive for regional coordination.109 This must include 
both public and private disciplines as communities comprise a natural network that 
involves many interdependencies. 
Regional can be defined as the extended spatial location of something.  This could 
include districts within a community, communities within a county, counties within a 
state or even states within a country. Regions offer the opportunity for stronger 
collaboration among disciplines and opportunity to become part of the solution. “You 
have to enable and empower people to make decisions independent of you. As I’ve 
learned, each person on a team is an extension of your leadership; if they feel empowered 
by you they will magnify your power to lead.”110 It has been found that regional 
organizations that include representation from numerous disciplines and diverse 
stakeholders serve as structured forums to discuss public policy problems and agree on 
possible solutions.111 
As local planning teams are created, organizations become involved in the process 
and begin to understand the roles and purpose of multi-discipline planning within a 
community. Although many essential services, such as electricity are provided from 
                                                 
108 Urban Land Institute, Building Florida’s Future—State Strategies for Regional Cooperation 
(Washington, DC, 2005), 7. 
109 House Committee on Government Reform, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination 
Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 4. 
110 Ridge quote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/t/tomridge195742.html, accessed 
September 20, 2007. 
111 Homeland Security, Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 7. 
 57
outside the community, a facility survey within the community may find very few if any 
facilities with backup power. By the community understanding as a whole may be 
without power for several days in adverse conditions could demonstrate the capability for 
portable generators that could be utilized by essential services such as food and 
sheltering. 
3.   Resilience 
As aging critical infrastructure is replaced, the ability to increase our resilience 
should be at the forefront. What is required is stronger importance placed on a proactive 
resilience-oriented planning process that addresses the continued operation and 
interdependencies in the occurrence of an event. A Council on Competitiveness study 
reports “that 25 percent of companies that experienced an IT outage of two to six days 
went bankrupt immediately. Ninety-three percent of companies that lost their data center 
for ten days or more filed for bankruptcy within a year.”112 The private sector is a major 
participant in the network that provides essential services and serves as an economic 
resource for local communities. A single loss of a business could have devastating effects 
upon the expected delivery of essential services. 
The successful adoption of a resilience policy in the United States will take time 
as recommendations of the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Critical Infrastructure 
Task Force have not been implemented Even though the idea of resiliency is gaining 
momentum, DHS and the federal government are moving far too slowly, paying 
rhetorical respect to resiliency in speeches but still mired in an outdated way of 
thinking.113 The former DHS assistant secretary for strategic plans has stated that if 
critical infrastructure was “Homeland Security 101,” then resiliency is “Homeland 
Security 301.”114 
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4.   Horizontal Planning 
Even without a resiliency policy, the nation lacks a mandatory standard that 
addresses Continuity of Operations for state and local jurisdictions. Without this 
standard, local planning continues to be in disarray and lacking the public – private 
partnerships necessary. As all incidents are local, planning must begin at the local level. 
A community consists of many sectors, some of which often cross local, state, and even 
international boundaries.  If the United States is to prosper in the twenty-first century, 
there must be a change in thinking.115The country cannot be part of an advanced society 
without being mindful of what made it advanced in the first place.116 It would be wise to 
recall that what sealed the fate of the Roman Empire was not attacks from without but rot 
from within.117 
Horizontal planning can be defined as sharing responsibility between industry, 
business, citizens and government to develop strategies that enable for the continued 
delivery of essential services that meets the expectations of the community.  Through 
horizontal planning and collaboration efforts, communities can identify the need for 
implementing resilience and could utilize it to spur economic growth.  Promoting the 
ability of a resilient community to deliver continued essential services in times of need 
could create more growth within the community. Increased growth provides for an 
increased tax base which generates additional revenues for the community.  
As an example, several states and provinces have moved forward with 
international public-private planning partnership to address the critical planning issues 
that face their region.  The delivery of essential services in a major event has been the 
focal point of their planning and exercise process. Since their inception, the Partnership 
                                                 




for Regional Infrastructure Security118 has conducted three major exercises call Blue 
Cascades to evaluate and improve their planning and capabilities. 
The Blue Cascades III Exercise was an innovative critical infrastructure exercise 
that involved public and private sector partners. The scenario affected critical 
infrastructure and essential services throughout the area for an extended amount of time. 
One of the findings was that a strong public-private partnership is necessary in 
coordinating local preparedness plans.119 This is critical to ensure the contingency plans 
of the private sector interact with the local government plan. 
The multi-state exercise also found that “citizens in the affected areas would be 
on their own for days at a minimum, given the level of disruptions and outages and the 
fact that there would be competing need for federal resources.”120  These results 
challenge the single incident – single jurisdiction planning guidance that most 
communities follow. This proactive approach was not the result of an incident occurring, 
but one of prevention and preparedness. 
5.   Addressing the Gap 
Closing the gap in public expectations and delivery of essential services requires 
the initiation of public and private collaboration driven by a horizontal or network based 
planning process. This form of planning allows the sharing and understanding of 
information that is utilized in determining community expectations. Local governmental 
structures provides for the horizontal planning and cooperation necessary for emergency 
preparedness, which is essential to the civil protection. 
The utilization of horizontal planning provides the ability for government, 
business and the public to understand and create strategy to meet expectations.  Applying 
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this planning model to the St. Clair County expectations of medical, and sheltering 
services is complex due to the deficiencies of the existing capabilities that exist due to the 
reliance upon interdependencies of many other services. But horizontal planning is 
intended to reduce the complexity by looking at the “whole network”, not just individual 
pieces and responsibilities. 
Collaboration brings government which establishes regulations and standards 
together will the private sector which provides the majority of services.  Understanding 
the responsibilities of and capabilities of the medical community enables the community 
to examine in-depth the ability to meet the expectations and the strategy necessary for 
change. Meeting the needs of medical surge will require the utilization of additional 
facilities, personnel and supplies at a minimum as well as the planned and collaborative 
efforts of multiple levels of government and the private sector.  
The existing medical surge planning underway identifies alternative facilities and 
limited auxiliary support personnel to deliver additional capacity requirements but does 
not take into consideration the interdependencies required and delivered by all public and 
private organizations. The necessity of having medical planning consistent and a subset 
of the community plan is essential to the overall strategy rather than the current method 
of just meeting the criteria of two separate grant requirements.  
The public expectations of shelter must also include food and water. All are 
reliant on interdependencies that cannot be planned for in isolation. The current planning 
assumes reliance on numerous agencies, departments and organizations without a method 
for cross discipline dialogue. Horizontal planning provides the collaboration process for 
St. Clair County to access and address the capability deficiencies. The failure to extend 
the current planning direction of single incident planning to one of major proportions,  
reliant on the entire community, will lead to a failure to meet expectations in time of 
need. 
Analyzing the results of the assessment of current capabilities to regards to risk 
and community expectations will provide the necessary information to create a strategy 
that must include prevention and preparedness efforts to minimize and recover from 
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incidents. Every aspect of a community is essential to the delivery and utilization of 
essential services. Additionally, an educated prepared public reduces the burden on the 
limited essential services.  
The strategy must include addressing the issue of the unprepared. Continuation of 
the current stove-pipe response oriented planning process must change. With many 
capabilities reliant upon interdependencies within and outside communities, the ability to 
strengthening capabilities to meet expectations should be based on community resilience. 
It will take the implementation of a horizontally based planning effort to identify and 
provide improved capabilities that will reduce the number of unprepared citizens 
requiring more demand for essential services. 
Applying the concept of horizontal planning to the expectation of sheltering 
services would begin in the local jurisdiction. Local planning teams comprised of the 
public and private partners would conduct a capabilities assessment of each community. . 
As sheltering is just not a building, the planning team would then examine the 
interdependencies of essential services required to operate the building and the 
community’s ability to provide those services. The reliance of essential services provided 
from outside a community can be proactively addressed locally. For example, a shelter 
relies on electricity that is not controlled locally however generator placement can be.   
6.   Conclusion 
The successful implementation of horizontal based planning will also provide for 
a more resilient community, which then further reduces the demand for essential services. 
The identification and understanding of the community expectations and the essential 
services required to meet them creates a positive common goal of being a “safe 
community.” The concept of a safe community promotes economic growth, even further 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Historically, national policy change in the wake of a crisis or tragedy has 
been quick and decisive. Unfortunately, in the absence of crisis and/or 
tragedy, proactive policy change, even that based on independent, 
disciplined, and well-considered study of people of unique experience, 
proven success and intellect, and specifically designed to address certain 
all-hazard consequences, has been strongly resisted and thus been far more 
difficult to implement.121 
 
Whether waiting for the national level or beginning locally, planning policy 
change must occur.  Any strategy developed must address the tipping point at which the 
single event becomes widespread major events leaving communities without the 
capability to meet community expectations.  
Understanding the expectations of an entire community becomes an important 
factor for proactive prevention and preparedness efforts prior to an incident occurring 
rather than the traditional respond and correct later. Utilizing public expectations 
compared with existing capabilities can be a critical analysis to further the reduction of 
risk and thereby reduce the gap between the two.   
Protection is an important factor but everything cannot be protected against 
everything and when protection fails, it fails completely. The importance of resiliency as 
policy will allow for less of a disruption in the delivery of essential services within a 
community. Many essential services rely on a network of interdependencies that may not 
be delivered or controlled locally.  The utilization of horizontal planning that includes 
every level of service provider enhances the ability to meet expectations and strengthens 
implementation of plans to reduce or eliminate gaps. 
Studies indicate that citizens want to become involved through volunteerism. This 
is a tremendous untapped asset which if used correctly, could reduce the gap between 
expectations of essential services and the ability to meet them in a catastrophic event. 
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When a community works together as a community in planning efforts, the collaboration 
and communication then allows for an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 
everyone. The community working towards a common goal then brings forth trust and 
confidence in the system and an understanding of the expectations of that community. 
This thesis identifies the need for change in the thought process which drives our 
planning to focus more on a proactive rather than a reactive approach. Change is difficult 
to implement as it forces the expansion of comfort zones. Change also requires learning 
and innovation to meet the changing environments. 
The failure to realize communities are comprised of citizens, business, industry 
and government among others rather than numerous independent sectors must change.  
The entire community forms a tightly woven network of interdependencies that are 
reliant on community-wide collaborative efforts. This demands the trust in the 
responsibilities of every asset ensuring the continued functionality of community 
capabilities in a major event.  
In St. Clair County, the expectations of the public are not being met and cannot be 
met in accordance to current federal guidance. This statement is based on the lack of a 
national mandated standard for continuity of operations for business and government and 
existing vertical-based planning guidance. Meeting expectations relies on services having 
interdependencies from other communities, states and nations. Local communities cannot 
plan for or assume those services will be available without this mandate. 
Identifying expectations in a proactive planning approach does provide a new 
opportunity for honest, open discussions throughout the community to discuss the 
expectations and ability to meet them. Citizens do not embrace potential change quickly, 
and the current lack of trust and confidence in government establishes a credibility issue 
potentially limiting the effectiveness of discussion and the provision for improving 
capabilities.  
The approach and ability to deliver the capabilities to meet expectations of both 
the public and private sectors are extremely difficult. Certain capabilities may never be 
attained due to budgetary or legislative issues. A collaborative effort will allow the 
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community to prioritize capabilities that reduce the gap between the public/private 
expectations and the community’s ability to provide the necessary essential services. 
If the current guidance is left unchanged, the challenge will lead to the inability of 
all parties to effectively prepare and respond to a large-scale event. The continued 
planning in isolation and lack of collaboration will only further impede the needed trust 
and confidence that is required for effective planning prior to an incident occurring. The 
















A public confidence survey was conducted within St. Clair County, Michigan; it 
included questions regarding expectations of essential services. Survey respondents were 
randomly selected from the county jury pool. A target sample of 600 residents, 
representing the population of 135,000 residing in the emergency management program 
area, was taken. The percent of county population was identified for each community and 
utilized to ensure an equal sampling per jurisdiction. 
The survey contained thirteen questions in which eleven were used as part of this 
thesis. The survey results provide an understanding of current public confidence and 
expectations of the government to provide essential services in a large-scale event. 
The questions asked on the survey that were utilized by this survey are: 
1. How concerned are you about the possibility that there will be a large-
scale emergency in St. Clair County? 
2. In general, how confident are you that County government is ready to 
respond effectively to a large scale catastrophe? 
3. In general, how confident are you that local (city or village) 
government is ready to respond effectively to a large scale catastrophe? 
4. In general, how confident are you that the local response system is 
ready to respond to a large scale catastrophe? 
5. In general, how confident are you that the health care system is ready to 
respond to a large scale catastrophe? 
6. In a large scale event, how soon do you expect emergency responders 
to be at your location providing assistance? 
7. What do you consider the five most essential services that you expect 
county government to provide immediately after a large scale event? 
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8. What do you consider the five most essential services that you expect 
local government to provide immediately after a large scale event? 
9. What do you consider the five most essential services that you expect 
the private sector (businesses) government to provide immediately after 
a large scale event? 
10. Do you have a family preparedness plan that all families know about? 
11. Which of the following does your workplace emergency preparedness 
kit include: 3 days supply of food and water; portable radio; first aid 
kit; flashlight; spare batteries. 
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Not Concerned       Very Concerned Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incomplete 
Answers 
Number  21 29 11 37 28 0 
Percentage 17% 23% 9% 29% 22% 0% 
       
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
1. How concerned are you about the possibility that there will be a large-scale emergency in St. Clair County? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   Not Concerned                  Very Concerned  
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Not Confident       Very Confident Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incomplete 
Answers 
Number  31 47 66 25 9 2 
Percentage 17% 26% 37% 14% 5% 1% 
       
       
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
1. In general, how confident are you that County government is ready to respond effectively to a large-scale catastrophe? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Confident Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incomplete 
Answers 
Number  43 52 48 23 11 3 
Percentage 24% 29% 27% 13% 6% 2% 
       
       
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
1. In general, how confident are you that local (city or village) government is ready to respond effectively to a large-scale catastrophe? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not Confident                  Very Confident  
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Not 
Confident       
Very 
Confident Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incomplete 
Answers 
Number  38 52 45 25 8 2 
Percentage 22% 31% 26% 15% 5% 1% 
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
1. In general, how confident are you that the emergency response system is ready to respond effectively to a large-scale catastrophe?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not Confident                  Very Confident  
 73
Question       
       
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
Not Confident       Very Confident Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incomplete 
Answers 
Number  41 44 44 36 13 2 
Percentage 23% 24% 24% 20% 7% 1% 
       
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       







1. In general, how confident are you that the health care system is ready to respond effectively to a large-scale catastrophe? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not Confident                  Very Confident  
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< 1 Hour < 12 Hours <24 Hours < 72 Hours > 72 Hours 
Incomplete 
Answers  
Number  40 66 21 22 17 7  
Percentage 23% 38% 12% 13% 10% 4%  
        
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        










        
 
7. In a large-scale event, how soon do you expect emergency responders to be at your location providing assistance? 
a. Less than one hour 
b. Less than 12 hours 
c. Less than 24 hours 
d. Less than 72 hours 
e. More than 72 hours 
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Question 8 — What do you consider the five most essential services that you expect 
county government to provide immediately after a large scale event? 
Top 10 Answers Number Percentage
Medical  122 17.2% 
Shelter  100 14.1% 
Communication 65 9.1% 
Food   60 8.4% 
Water  58 8.2% 
Security  35 4.9% 
Evacuation 27 3.8% 
Power  25 3.5% 
Transportation 23 3.2% 
Police  22 3.0% 
Incomplete 17   
 
Question 9 — What do you consider the five most essential services that you expect 
local government to provide immediately after a large scale event? 
Top 10 Answers Number Percentage
Medical  99 16.7% 
Shelter  73 12.3% 
Communication 62 10.5% 
Food   51 8.6% 
Water  49 8.3% 
Security  29 4.9% 
Fire  25 5.5% 
Police  25 5.5% 
Transportation 21 3.5% 
Evacuation 20 3.4% 
Incomplete 18   
 
Question 10 — What do you consider the five most essential services that you expect the 
private sector (businesses) provide immediately after a large scale event? 
Top 10 Answers Number Percentage 
Food    52 12.0% 
Shelter   44 10.1% 
Water   36 8.3% 
Medical   35 8.1% 
None   27 6.2% 
Support   24 5.5% 
Supplies   24 5.5% 
Communication 24 8.1% 
Fuel   15 5.1% 
Money   14 3.2% 
Incomplete 20   
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 Answer  Number Percentage 
 Yes   71 41.3% 
 No   92 53.5% 
 Incomplete   9 5.2% 
     
 
      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Disaster Kit Items   
     
Item Have Do Not Have Percentage 
3 Day Supply Food 
and Water 72 26 18.4% 
Portable Radio 79 19 13.5% 
First Aid Kit 85 13 9.2% 
Emergency Phone 
Numbers 74 24 17.0% 
Flashlight 93 5 3.5% 
Spare Batteries 89 9 6.4% 
Meeting Place for 
Family Members in 
case of evacuation 53 45 31.9% 
Incomplete answers 0 77   
11. Do you have a family emergency preparedness plan that all family members know about?  YES NO 
 
If yes, which of the following does your family emergency preparedness kit include? (Circle all that apply)  
 
Three days supply of food and water 
Portable Radio 
First Aid Kit 
Emergency Phone numbers 
Flashlight 
Spare batteries 





Question      
      
 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 Item 




item   
 Food and Water 22 53   
 Portable Radio 40 35   
 First Aid Kit 67 8   
 Flashlight 53 22   
 Spare Batteries 45 30   
   
 
Incomplete, retired, does not work 
or does not have kit 100   
 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
11. Which of the following does your workplace emergency preparedness kit include?  (Circle all that apply) 
 
Three days supply of food and water 
Portable Radio 
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APPENDIX TWO 
The blackout of 2003 provided the opportunity for St. Clair County to redefine 
their planning process. Although the occurrence was in the warm summer months, the 
Homeland Security – Emergency Management Office studied the effects of the incident 
as if it had also occurred in cold winter months. The following chart compares the actual 
summertime occurrence to if it had occurred in winter. 
 
EXPECTATION SUMMER WINTER 
Medical Surge could occur due to heat 
related injuries.  
 
Routine medical care disrupted due 
to minimal facilities with backup 
power. 
 
Potential disruption of supply chain.
Surge could occur due to cold 
related injuries. Weather will slow 
response times. 
 
Routine medical care disrupted due 
to minimal facilities with backup 
power. Longer disruption may 
occur due to plumbing freezing and 
damage in unheated facilities. 
 
Potential disruption of supply chain. 
Shelter Sheltering from inclement weather 
available however summer allows 
the ability to function outside. 
 
Majority of shelters lack backup 
power capabilities. 
 
Inside sheltering is essential due to 
cold weather. 
 
Majority of shelters lack backup 
power capabilities necessary to 
produce heat. 
 Food Potential disruption of supply chain. 
 
Majority of shelters and food 
providers lack backup power 
capabilities. 
 
Limited availability of food due to 
spoilage issues. 
 
More ability to utilize portable 
grills for outside cooking. 
Potential disruption of supply chain. 
 
Majority of shelters and food 
providers lack backup power 
capabilities. 
 
Cold weather may assist in food 
preservation. 
 
Less ability to utilize cooking 
facilities. 
Water Residential well systems will not 




Residential well systems will not 





Potential disruption of supply chain 
limiting bottled water and numerous 
other products and services. 
Cold may expedite freezing of 
systems creating additional damage. 
 
Potential disruption of supply chain 
limiting bottled water and numerous 
other products and services 
Communication Proven disruption and overloading 
of cell phones and telephones. 
 
Ability to be outside allows contact 
and information flow between 
neighbors. 
 
People at facilities not having 
backup power must rely on battery 
powered radios. 
Proven disruption and overloading 
of cell phones and telephones. 
 
People at facilities not having 
backup power must rely on battery 
powered radios. 
 
Cold weather reduces outside 
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